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SUPREME COURT - SUPER CENSOR?
by
Francis B. Burch*
The article "Supreme Court - Super Censor? by FrancisB.
Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, presents some of the
arguments made by Mr. Burcb to the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Grove Press, Inc. v. Maryland State Board
of Censors. In that case, involving the motion picture "I am
Curious (Yellow)," Mr. Burcb was successful in persuading the
Supreme Court, by a 4-4 vote of the Justices participating,to
affirm the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals that the
motion picture was obscene.
The members of the United States Supreme Court have seldom been
so sharply divided as they have been in recent years in cases involving
the question of what constitutes obscenity in books and motion
pictures. The division among the Justices is accentuated today because
the growing number of "X" rated films seems to be a matter of
increasing concern to the public. Disagreement among the members of
the Court in an area of such high public visibility is unfortunate because
the resulting confusion and lack of understanding subjects the Court to
much criticism, some of which is uninformed and unwarranted.
However, some criticism may be justified in the light of the fact that
confusion prevails not only among members of the public but also
among the lower courts and lawyers who are attempting to understand
and apply the standards for judging obscenity. This article seeks to
discuss briefly the general state of the law in this area and to suggest
several approaches which may be more workable for all parties
concerned.
One of the few things which a majority of the Supreme Court has
been able to agree upon in the obscenity area is that obscene materials
are not protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech. In
Rotb v. United States, the Court stated: "We hold that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." '
However, the standards for judging what is obscene, and hence, not
protected by the Constitution are by no means as clear as the Court's
unequivocal statement in Rotb. Most recently, lower courts have been
following a three-point test in determining the obscenity of materials
before them. Essentially, these courts have held that for materials to be
obscene, the following three elements must coalesce: (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
* Attorney General of Maryland; LL.B., Yale Law School.
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sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual materials; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value. 2 The test outlined above is often referred to as having been
established in the Rotb decision as "restated with somewhat different
emphasis perhaps by the Supreme Court in A Book Named 'John
Cleland's Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure' v. Attorney General, 383
U.S. 413, 418, 86 S.Ct. 975, 977, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 5-6 (1966) ....

Certainly the exact language used by the Supreme Court in Rotb does
not go as far as the three-point test. The standard set forth in Rotb was:
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest."4 Obviously, the three-point test includes several
elements which the Court did not mention in Rotb. When and in what
manner did the other elements, "patently offensive" and "utterly
without redeeming social value," purportedly come into the law?
The "patently offensive test" appears to have come from the opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises v. Day.' This "test",
however, received the concurrence of only Mr. Justice Stewart in that
case. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment
for different reasons, 6 and Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan.7 Mr. Justice
Black concurred in the result without opinion; 8 Mr. Justice Clark filed
a dissenting opinion. 9 Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
took no part in the decision. A review of subsequent cases does not
indicate that a majority of the Supreme Court has committed itself in
any one case to the "patently offensive" test.
The "utterly without redeeming social value" test as applied to
motion pictures apparently originated in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Brennan in Jacobellis v. Ohio,1 0 involving the French motion picture
"Les Amants" ("The Lovers"). Here again, only Mr. Justice Goldberg
concurred in the opinion, with Messrs. Justices Black, Douglas, White
and Stewart concurring in the judgment only.' I Mr. Justice Harlan
2 See, e.g., Wagonheim v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297, 304-05,258 A.
2d 240, 253-44 (1969).
3 Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179, 182, 254 A. 2d 203, 205
(1969).
4 354 U.S. at 489.
s 379 U.S. 478 (1962).
6 Id. at 495.
7 Id.
a Id.
9 Id. at 519.
10 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
1 Id. at 196.
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dissented,1 I as did Mr. Chief Justice Warren' I and Mr. Justice Clark, 1 4
so that this "test" did not receive the approval of a majority of the
Supreme Court. The "utterly without redeeming social value" test was
repeated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of A Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General.' s However, again the "test" did not
receive the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court, the opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan receiving the approval of only Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas. Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice White and
Mr. Justice Harlan, in separate dissenting opinions in Memoirs observed
that the social value test was "novel" and that only three members of
the Supreme Court adopted it. 1 6 They further pointed out that such a
test rejects the Rotb test to which, as above indicated, a majority of the
Supreme Court did agree.' 7 In the case of Redrup v. New York,'I the
per curiam opinion of the Court was careful to state that the necessity
of meeting the three-point test was a view held only by certain justices
in Memoirs. ' 9 Redrup did not cite the three-point test as the test of the
Supreme Court.
The definition of obscenity is not the only problem. Serious
problems have been created by the Supreme Court's undertaking of
what is, for all practical purposes, a de novo review of lower court
decisions. The Court made the requirement of de novo review clear in
Jacobellis:
.. [W] e reaffirm the principal that, in 'obscenity' cases, as
in all others involving rights derived from the First Amendment
guarantees of free speech, this Court cannot avoid making
independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as
to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected .... 2 0
In following this procedure of review, the Supreme Court practically
assumes the role of a trial court, including judging the weight and
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses. There is some question as
to whether this kind of review is necessary or practical in view of the
volume of cases which the Court must consider. There is also a question
as to whether the relevant constitutional principles require that there be
only one definition of obscenity promulgated by the Supreme Court
and applicable to all of the states.
12 id. at 203.
13 Id. at 199.
14 Id.
1s .383 U.S. 413 (1966).
16 Id. at 441, 455, 460.
17 Id.
18 386 U.S. 767 (1967), rehearingdenied, 388 U. S. 924 (1967).
19 Id. at 770.
20 378 U. S. at 190.
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Obviously, there is no simple answer to these complex problems.
However, several members of the Supreme Court have suggested
different approaches which appear to be legally sound and practicably
workable. They deserve some consideration and could provide the
beginnings of a way out of the present morass.
Both Mr. Justice Harlan and the former Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Warren, have, in several cases, suggested fundamental changes in the
procedures followed by the Supreme Court in obscenity cases. The
proposed changes could alleviate some of the difficulties in the present
system. Mr. Justice Harlan has expressed concern over the constitutional ramifications of the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of
Obscenity and in the Roth case expounded his position as to the proper
role of the Court in reviewing decisions of state courts. He said that the
Supreme Court does not decide whether the state action-in the form
of legislation-was wise but only whether it "so subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause that it cannot be
sustained as a rational exercise of power." 2 1 He emphasized his belief
that state legislatures can make the policy determination that "pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state may deem
obnoxious to the moral fabric of society." 2 2 Proceeding from these
views, Mr. Justice Harlan, in Memoirs, summarized his position on the
proper role of the Supreme Court and the state courts as follows:
....From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment
requires of a State only that it apply criteria rationally related
to the accepted notion of obscenity and that it reach results not
wholly out of step with current American standards. As to
criteria, it should be adequate if the court or jury consider such
elements as offensiveness, pruriency, social value, and the like.
The latitude which I believe the States deserve cautions against
any federally imposed formula listing the exclusive ingredients
of obscenity and fixing their proportions ...23
Mr. Chief Justice Warren had difficulties with de novo review in
obscenity cases. He would require that the Supreme Court affirm the
decisions of the lower courts if the findings of those courts, based on an
application of the Roth test, were supported by "sufficient evidence."
Mr. Chief Justice Warren expressed his position in Jacobellis succinctly
but eloquently:
...I would commit the enforcement of this rule to the
appropriate state and federal courts, and I would accept their
judgments made pursuant to the Roth rule, limiting myself to a
consideration only of whether there is sufficient evidence in the
21 354 U. S. at501.

22 Id.
23 383 U.S. at 458.
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record upon which a finding of obscenity could be made ....
[P] rotection of society's right to maintain its moral fiber and
the effective administration of justice require that this Court
not establish itself as an ultimate censor, in each case reading
the entire record, viewing the accused material, and making an
independent de novo judgment on the question of obscenity.
Therefore, once a finding of obscenity has been made below
under a proper application of the Rotb test, I would apply a
'sufficient evidence' standard of review - requiring something
more than merely any evidence but something less than
'substantial evidence on the record... ' This is the only'
reasonable way I can see to obviate the necessity of this Court s
sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed
throughout the Nation... 24
It is submitted that the combination of Mr. Justice Harlan's "rational
standards" test combined with Mr. Chief Justice Warren's "sufficient
evidence" test would relieve some of the workload of the Supreme
Court. At the same time the utilization of these tests would be an
implicit recognition of the ability of state courts/ to make sound
judgments in this area of constitutional law. Of course, the decisions of
the lower courts must be subject to 'review by the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter of the Constitution. However, it is submitted that the state
courts are both responsible for and capable of interpreting, enforcing
and protecting constitutional rights without the necessity of the
Supreme Court in the same case repeating the procedures followed by
the reviewing courts below.
How would the adoption of Mr. Justice Harlan's "rational standards"
principle affect the problem of the definition of obscenity? Presumably, it would give the state courts more latitude in choosing among the
many definitions found in judicial decisions and elsewhere. The
"rational" limitation on the standards applied by the lower courts
implies that the Supreme Court would act to prevent both overly
prudish definitions which would do violence to freedom of expression
as well as overly loose ones. It could be argued that the Supreme Court
would spend the time saved by elimination of de novo review in
reviewing the large variety of definitions of obscenity propounded by
the lower courts. Even assuming that the Court would be deluged with
an infinite variety of definitions, in reviewing them it would be
considering legal principles and not engaging in time-consuming de novo
review. However, it is unlikely that the Court would have to spend a
great deal of time in reviewing definitions of obscenity. The standards
for fudging obscenity have been exhaustively discussed in many judicial
decisions. The state courts are fully aware of the arguments for and
24 378 U. S. at 202.
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against the various definitions and are certainly capable of following
standards which will be constitutionally acceptable.
An endorsement of Mr. Justice Harlan's "rational standards" test
perhaps requires some statement as to what would constitute the most
rational standard. It is submitted that, all things considered, the test set
forth in Rotb, without its modification in later cases, provides the most
workable definition of obscenity. The standard set forth in Rotb was,
again: "whether to the average person, applying comtemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest."' 2 s "Without redeeming social
value" should not be made an independent part of the test as it has
been in later decisions. Its use in this manner promotes the protection
of films into which social statements are inserted haphazardly for the
sole purpose of seeking the right to display otherwise obscene material.
This is not to say that "social value" has no place in the standards for
fudging obscenity. Obviously, the constitutional rights of free expression on social issues must be given stringent protection. However, the
proper place for "social value," as argued by Mr. Justice White in his
dissenting opinion in Memoirs, is as a part of the determination as to
whether the material in question is calculated to appeal predominantly
2
to prurient interests. 6
The observations set forth herein are not intended as a condemnation
of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the obscenity area. The setting
of standards by which obscenity is to be judged is a task of obvious
complexity and difficulty. However, the present state of the law is
unnecessarily confused and some action by the Court to clear the air
seems appropriate. Moreover, the seeds of a solution can possibly be
found in opinions written by various members of the Court. Perhaps
the principles set forth in these opinions could provide a common
ground for a new approach to some of the problems in the obscentiy
area, an approach which would be acceptable to a majority of the
Court. Hopefully, in the near future there will be guidance for lower
courts and for lawyers in the form of an opinion in which a majority of
the. Court agrees on the disposition of the major issues of the
definitions of obscenity and the procedures followed by the Court in
reviewing obscenity cases.

25
26

See note 4, supra.
383 U. S. at 462.

